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Time
Suzanna Sherry*
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C. Erie Is Pernicious
IV. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE WORST CASES OF ALL
TIME
I. INTRODUCTION
A symposium on the most maligned Supreme Court decisions of all time
risks becoming an exercise best described by Claude Rains’s memorable line
in Casablanca: “Round up the usual suspects.” Two things save this
symposium from that fate. First, each of the usual suspects has been
appointed defense counsel, which makes things more interesting. Second, a
new face has found its way into the line-up: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.1
My goal in this essay is to explain why Erie is in fact guiltier than all of the
usual suspects.
I begin, in Part II, by setting out the three criteria that I believe must be
satisfied for a decision to qualify as the worst of all time. I also explain
briefly why each of the usual suspects fails to meet one or more of those

* Herman O. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. This essay is part of
Pepperdine Law Review’s April 1, 2011 Supreme Mistakes symposium, exploring the most maligned
decisions in Supreme Court history. I thank Paul Edelman, Maria Glover, Michael Greve, and Jay
Tidmarsh for comments on this essay.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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criteria. The heart of the essay is Part III, examining in detail how Erie
satisfies each of the three criteria. I close with some concluding thoughts on
the surprising relationship between Erie’s flaws and those of the other
suspects.
II. THE WORST OF THE WORST
What do we mean—what should we mean—when we label a Supreme
Court decision “the worst of all time”? I suggest that to be worthy of such
infamy, a decision must satisfy three criteria: it must be wrong, it must not
be explainable as a product of its time, and it must have lasting detrimental
effects. The requirement that the decision be wrong needs no explanation,
but the other two criteria are worth a brief discussion.
One difficulty in searching more than two centuries of Supreme Court
cases for the worst decision is that the older cases necessarily reflect
different sensibilities than our own and are therefore more likely to seem
wrong, even egregiously so. But it is anachronistic to evaluate Supreme
Court decisions by contemporary standards; even worse, it partakes of the
whiggish historian’s fallacy that our current standards are inevitably
superior. The only way to avoid the problem is to judge the cases by
contemporaneous standards, and thus to exclude from consideration any
cases that are easily explained as products of their times. Note that I am not
asking whether a particular result was inevitable under the circumstances,
but only whether it reflects values and beliefs that were widely shared at the
time.
The final requirement arises from the recognition that the Supreme
Court inevitably makes mistakes. Some mistakes, however, are more
significant than others. If the errors are quickly corrected, or if for some
other reason the case has no lasting significance, it is inappropriate to
condemn that error as harshly as those that endure. Thus, to qualify as the
worst decision of all time, a case should have lasting and significant
deleterious effects.
All of the cases selected for this symposium meet the first requirement:
They are all wrong.2 But all of them fail the second requirement. Each one
reflects the circumstances and prevalent values of its time and place, and
although some Americans—and some Justices—rejected those values, it is
anachronistic for us to condemn the majority for its failure to do so. Dred
Scott3 represented an accurate interpretation of the original public meaning
of the 1787 Constitution, and a choice among two (soon to be literally)

2. Each is wrong under some plausible definition of “wrong.” It is possible that there is no
single definition that encompasses all five cases.
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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warring belief systems.4 Plessy5 reflected what one scholar has described as
the consensus of both elite opinion makers and the political branches, who
“displayed no enthusiasm for an assault on legally imposed racial
separation.”6 It also conformed to the pervasive racist assumptions and the
widespread view shared by the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment and
many whites (Northern and Southern) in the 1890s that blacks, even if they
were entitled to equal civil and political rights, were not the social equals of
whites.7 Buck8 was grounded in the pseudo-scientific eugenics movement,
which had broad and deep support across the political spectrum.9 And
Korematsu10 was decided at a time when racism was not yet universally
condemned—the armed forces were still segregated and Brown v. Board of
Education11 was almost a decade in the future—and the memory of the day
that would live in infamy was raw and fresh. Moreover, as subsequent
research has revealed, government lawyers fundamentally misled the Court
as to the likelihood of a Japanese invasion,12 making the case even less
surprising.
As for lasting detrimental effects, only Plessy—which allowed Jim
Crow laws to deepen, racism to become more entrenched, and the status of
African-Americans to deteriorate for almost sixty years—qualifies. The
decision in Dred Scott, by contrast, became effectively moot four years later
as the Civil War began and the holding was officially reversed with the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 Buck, although it allowed
sterilization of many individuals, was thoroughly discredited (and all but

4. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
5. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
6. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER 1888–1910, at 155
(1995).
7. See, e.g., JOHN BRAEMAN, BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: THE OLD COURT AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 121 (1988); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION 93–115 (1987); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 504–
08 (2d ed. 1985).
8. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
9. See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR
TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 21–23 (2008). According to Nourse, public opinion did not shift
away from support for eugenics until it became linked with Nazism, a decade after Buck. Id. at 126–
31.
10. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. See generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT
CASES (1983).
13. Nor did the case cause the Civil War; the same conflicts over slavery and other issues that
led to the case itself were inevitably drawing the nation into war.

131

overruled) fifteen years later in Skinner v. Oklahoma.14 The decision in
Korematsu was even shorter-lived. On the same day it upheld the exclusion
order in Korematsu, the Supreme Court limited the damage by invalidating
the internment order in Ex parte Endo.15 The case was famously condemned
by a leading scholar before the war was even over,16 a federal court later
overturned Fred Korematsu’s conviction for violating the exclusion order,17
and the federal government eventually apologized and made restitution.18
Korematsu’s most lasting contribution was its assertion—ignored in the case
itself but bearing fruit later—that “legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect” and must be
subjected to “the most rigid scrutiny.”19
Although all of the usual suspects are guilty, then, they are in some
sense not pernicious. As I demonstrate in the next Part, only Erie satisfies
all three requirements: it is wrong, it cannot be described as a product of its
time, and it had—and continues to have—significant detrimental effects.
III. THE TROUBLE WITH ERIE
A. Erie Was Wrong
Just in case you’ve forgotten your Civil Procedure course: The question
in Erie was whether state or federal law should apply to state-law claims that
were brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.20 The Rules of
Decision Act—originally enacted as Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789—provides that “[t]he laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in
the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”21 In 1842, in
Swift v. Tyson,22 the Court interpreted that Act as requiring the application of

14. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). One recent case notes that “the only part of Buck v. Bell that remains
unrepudiated” is the statement that an Equal Protection Claim for selective enforcement “is the usual
last resort of constitutional arguments.” Feiger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)).
15. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). As one commentator notes, “Endo shows Korematsu to be marginal.”
Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1967 (2003).
16. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945).
17. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
18. See Act of Aug. 10, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989–1989b).
19. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
20. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). Although there have been stylistic changes to the statute since its
enactment in 1789, the substance has not changed. For the original Judiciary Act, see the Judiciary
Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
22. 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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only state statutory law, and not state common law.23 In the absence of a
state statute, federal courts were to apply federal common law.24 In Erie, the
Court overruled Swift and held that in adjudicating state-law claims, federal
courts should apply both state statutes and state common law.25
The majority opinion in Erie famously rested on three grounds: a new
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, the “defects” of Swift, and the
“unconstitutionality of the course pursued” under Swift. The Court was
mistaken on each ground.
1. The Rules of Decision Act
The Court rested its statutory reinterpretation on the “recent research of
a competent scholar,” which, it said, established that the Swift Court’s
interpretation was “erroneous.”26 Relying on Charles Warren’s New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,27 the Court concluded
that the purpose of the Rules of Decision Act was “to make certain that . . .
the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases
would apply as their rules of decision the law of the state, unwritten as well
as written.”28 Unfortunately, there are three fatal flaws in the Court’s
reasoning. First, Warren’s research showed no such thing. Second, research
subsequent to Warren’s demonstrates that it is probable that Swift itself gave
too much credit to state law and thus that the move from Swift to Erie took
the law further from the intent of the enacting Congress. Third, for almost a
century between 1842 and 1938, not only had Congress acquiesced in Swift,
but bills to amend the Act and overrule Swift had failed to pass, suggesting
that Swift accurately represented the continuing will of Congress.
Warren’s research unearthed a manuscript copy of the bill that
eventually became the Judiciary Act, together with a handwritten draft of
Section 34 providing that “the Statute law of the several States in force for
the time being and their unwritten or common law now in use” should apply
in “trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where
they apply.”29 From this he concluded that the language actually enacted—
”the laws of the several States”—must be read to include both statutory law

23. Id. at 18–19.
24. Id.
25. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80.
26. Id. at 72.
27. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49 (1923).
28. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73.
29. Warren, supra note 27, at 86–87 (emphasis added).

133

and common law.30 In the absence of any further evidence (and Warren had
none), however, there is no way to determine whether the change in the
italicized language was or was not intended to change the substantive
meaning of the statute. Perhaps, as Warren suggested, Congress assumed
that “laws” included common law, and the change was stylistic.31 Or
perhaps Congress instead deliberately meant to exclude common law from
the Rules of Decision Act and changed the language for that reason.
A further contemporaneous indication that Warren’s conclusion was
incorrect is that Section 34 is near the end of the 1789 Judiciary Act, far
from the sections on diversity jurisdiction. The draft Warren found
indicated that it was to be inserted on page fifteen of the bill, again, near the
end and far from the sections on diversity jurisdiction.32 Thus, Section 34
was placed—and seemingly was intended to be placed—among other
sections dealing with all suits in any federal courts, and was most likely a
general direction about how federal courts should go about their
adjudicatory business rather than a specific direction about the law
applicable to state claims in diversity cases.33
More recent research confirms that Justice Story’s interpretation in Swift
was closer to the intent of the enacting Congress than was Warren’s. Let us
begin with the language of the Act itself. In 1789, there was a clear and
recognized difference between two phrases: “the respective states” referred
to the states individually, but “the several states” referred to the states
collectively.34 Thus, the instruction in Section 34 to apply “the laws of the
several states” directed courts not to the law of any individual state, but
rather to the law of all states—in other words, to federally developed
common law.35 The purpose was to ensure that American law, not British
law, would apply in the federal courts.36 Moreover, an early draft of the
Judiciary Act created a federal district that included all of New Hampshire
and part of Massachusetts, further suggesting that the drafters did not expect

30. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 86–88.
32. Warren himself thought the page notation on the newly discovered draft referred to the page
of the thirty-seven page manuscript copy of the bill, but it is more probable that it referred to the
page of the printed bill, which ran only fifteen pages. See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE
HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING
NEW EVIDENCE 137–40 (1990); JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 463–66 (1971).
33. For elaboration, see RITZ, supra note 32, at 136–37.
34. Id. at 83–87, 140–41.
35. Id. at 140.
36. Id. at 148. Ritz suggests that Section 34 was even more limited: It was “intended as a
temporary measure to provide an applicable American law for national criminal prosecutions” until
Congress enacted statutes defining and governing federal crimes. Id. For a further argument that
Warren’s reinterpretation was “shaky,” see Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 903–04 (1986).
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federal courts to apply the law of any particular state.37 And any individual
state’s law—whether statutory or judge-made—would not have been readily
available at the end of the eighteenth century; the sources of law were
chaotic and disorganized.38 Thus, the enacting Congress probably did not
intend for federal courts sitting in diversity to apply either state statutory law
or state common law, but rather to apply federal common law.39
Finally, examination of the legislative history of the Process Act,40
passed immediately after the Judiciary Act, further suggests that Section 34
was not intended to make state law applicable in federal courts. The Process
Act explicitly directed federal courts to use state procedural law, providing
that “the modes of process” in the federal courts “shall be the same in each
state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the
same.”41 In the course of debates over the Process Act, an amendment was
proposed that would have incorporated state substantive laws on insolvency
and debtor relief; according to a newspaper account, the amendment “was
negatived by a large majority.”42
We can draw several strong inferences from this account. First, the use
of “respectively” rather than “severally” in the Process Act bolsters the
linguistic argument that the use of “severally” in Section 34 refers to federal
common law rather than to state law. Second, the Congress did not think
that Section 34 required the application of any state substantive law, else the
amendment would have been unnecessary.43 Third, a “large majority” of the
House did not want at least a particular type of state substantive law to apply
in federal diversity cases. This last inference is further supported by the best
explanation of the original purpose of diversity jurisdiction: to protect
creditors and other commercial interests from parochial state laws,
especially those favoring debtors or interfering with the growth of the

37. See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1506–07.
38. See RITZ, supra note 32, at 49–50; see also GOEBEL, supra note 32, at 471.
39. To the extent that Swift was itself incorrectly decided, Congress’s failure to correct the
error—which reflected judicial decisions from the early 1800s on—diminishes the seriousness of
that error.
40. Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, § 2 (1789).
41. Id.
42. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, The Rise of Legal Positivism,
and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 108–09 (1993).
43. The timing supports this inference. The House agreed to the Senate version of the Judiciary
Act, ceasing debate, on September 21, 1789; the Act was signed by President Washington on
September 24. See GOEBEL, supra note 32, at 507. The amendment to the Process Act was
proposed on September 24, 1789. See Borchers, supra note 42, at 108.
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national economy.44 Those parochial state laws, of course, were as likely to
be statutory as to be common law (and maybe more likely), thus confirming
again that even the Swift Court’s reading of Section 34 was incorrect insofar
as it required the application of state statutes in diversity cases.
Reading Section 34 as a direction to apply federal common law is also
consistent with the historical precursors of diversity jurisdiction and with the
immediate post-enactment practice. Eighteenth-century American lawyers
would have been quite familiar with the concept of applying a specialized
type of law to transnational or non-local disputes: Greek, Roman, and
English law had developed such specialized sources of law.45 During the
ratification debates, a number of Federalists and Anti-Federalists suggested
that federal courts would apply general common law.46 Unsurprisingly, the
newly-created federal courts immediately began to develop and apply
general federal common law; Swift was merely an unexceptional example of
a longstanding practice.47 Moreover, the conventional modern assumption
that Erie returned to an original understanding of “profound limits on
nonstate, judge-made law in the federal court” is called into question by the
fact that “[o]n the equity side of the docket, application of uniform, nonstate,
judge-made law was the norm.”48 And in 1828, Congress rejected proposals
to force federal courts to follow state law in equity cases, after extensive
debates in the House of Representatives raising both federalism and

44. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483
(1928); Holt, supra note 37; Borchers, supra note 42, at 86–98; David Marcus, Erie, the Class
Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1247, 1265–70 (2007) (collecting sources); see also Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly
Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997,
1010–17 (2007) (providing further historical background to demonstrate that the pro-creditor
account is superior to the traditional “state-court bias” account). One set of commentators draws a
distinction between cases in which states are likely to be biased in the application of law and cases in
which states are likely to be biased in the creation of law. In the former circumstance, a neutral
forum in the form of diversity jurisdiction is sufficient; in the latter, a separate source of law—
federal common law—is needed to combat the bias. Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of
Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 627–30 (2006). I suggest that while the distinction
is useful, those who included diversity jurisdiction in Article III and Section 34 in the Judiciary Act
were equally concerned about both types of bias.
45. Borchers, supra note 42, at 82–86.
46. Defending the grant of diversity jurisdiction, James Wilson argued: “I would ask, how a
merchant must feel to have his property lay at the mercy of the laws of Rhode Island? I ask further,
how will a creditor feel, who has his debts at the mercy of tender laws in other states?” James
Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 519 (1976). See also Agrippa, V, in 4 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 77–78 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (A federal court in diversity “is not bound to
try [a case] according to the local laws where the controversies happen; for in that case it may as
well be tried in a state court. The rule which is to govern the new courts, must, therefore, be made
by the court itself, or by its employers, the Congress.”).
47. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1513 (1984).
48. See Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and
Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 335 (2010).
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separation-of-powers arguments about the legitimacy of federal judicial
lawmaking.49 No wonder Swift was unanimous, joined even by a Justice
“who has been characterized as the most extreme states’ rights enthusiast
ever to sit on the Supreme Court.”50
All of the contemporaneous evidence, then, suggests that the enacting
Congress did not intend even the Swift interpretation of Section 34, much
less the Warren and Erie interpretation. But what about subsequent
Congresses? Congress’s failure to amend the Rules of Decision Act in the
century following Swift suggests, albeit weakly, congressional acquiescence
in Swift’s interpretation. A stronger inference can be drawn from the fact
that in the decade preceding Erie, three bills had been introduced in
Congress to override Swift, and none had passed.51 On any theory of
statutory interpretation, therefore, Erie got it wrong.
2. The “Defects” of Swift
The decision to overrule Swift also rested on the Court’s assertion that
experience with Swift had “revealed its defects, political and social,” and had
shown that “the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not accrue.”52
The court focused on three failures of the Swift regime: it caused “grave
discrimination” between citizens and non-citizens of a state, it did not
produce the hoped-for uniformity of law, and it introduced new uncertainties
by requiring courts to draw an impossible line between general and local
law.53 The subtext of the decision, and probably the motivation for at least
Justice Brandeis’s condemnation of Swift, also focused on the antiProgressive consequences of allowing large corporations to substitute
hospitable federal law in place of hostile state law.54

49. Id. at 304–15.
50. TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 3 (1981).
51. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 n.21 (1938). See also FREYER, supra note
50, at 109 (showing that at least eight bills to curb corporate abuse of diversity jurisdiction were
introduced between 1928 and 1932).
52. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
53. Id.
54. For an account of Justice Brandeis’s Progressive politics as underlying Erie, see generally
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL
POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000)
(describing Erie as arising out of Brandeis’s Progressive politics, especially his commitment to
social justice and hostility to large corporations); see also THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF
REGULATION 80–142 (1984) (describing Brandeis as fundamentally opposed to big business).
Ironically, it was a similar agrarian prejudice against the mercantile class that led to the need for
Swift in the first place. See FREYER, supra note 50, at 9–10, 40–41.
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The first—and probably least significant—problem with this rationale
for Erie is that some of these “defects” were greatly exaggerated. Despite a
perception that federal law was more favorable to corporate interests, there
were many cases (including Erie itself), in which the opposite was true. In
two of the cases in which Justice Holmes had previously railed against Swift
in dissent, for example, the Court upheld the rights of landowners—against a
coal company in one case and an elevated railway company in the other—
under general federal law despite state law to the contrary.55 Similarly, the
poster-child for corporate abuse of diversity jurisdiction—the Black & White
Taxicab case56 lambasted in Erie—may well have been the only example of
such abuse.57 As several scholars have noted, the claim of discrimination
between citizens and non-citizens was inaccurate; both could invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in the same situations.58 As for uniformity,
the issue depends on whether inter- or intra-state uniformity is at stake, and
Brandeis never explained why the latter was more important than the former.
Moreover, at least with regard to the substantive commercial law doctrine at
issue in Swift itself, Felix Frankfurter’s influential claim in 1928 that the
states had refused to follow it59 appears to be largely false.60
But even if we assume that the Swift regime caused the defects Brandeis
identified, there is a more serious objection to Erie. The decision might be
defensible if it corrected the problems. It didn’t. Under Erie, we still lack
uniformity, some litigants—especially corporate litigants—still fare better
than others as a result of happenstance, and the courts are still required to
draw impossible lines.
The crux of the continuing problem is that Erie simply replaced the
vertical forum-shopping of Swift with horizontal forum-shopping. Instead of
choosing between state and federal courts in order to obtain the benefit of
state or federal law, litigants now choose among courts (state and federal)
located in different states in order to obtain the benefit of a particular state’s

55. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 349 (1910) (holding that a coal company is liable
to landowner for failure to leave sufficient support of the surface land, despite contrary ruling of
state supreme court); Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 544 (1905) (holding that
elevated railway company owed compensation to neighboring property owner for use of light, air,
and access, despite state statute granting unencumbered right to railway).
56. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518 (1928).
57. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 14) (documenting that Black & White Taxicab was “singular, and hardly warranted
the overruling of a century’s worth of precedents”).
58. See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 54, at 162; G. Edward White, A Customary International
Law of Torts, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 755, 793–94 (2006).
59. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 528–29, n.150 (1928).
60. See Hessel E. Yntema & George H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction,
79 U. PA. L. REV. 869, 881–86 n.23 (1931).
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law.61 Whether litigants are successful in their search for the most favorable
forum still often depends on happenstance; the constitutional limits on
personal jurisdiction, which depend on the citizenship and activities of the
defendant, allow some defendants but not others to escape the plaintiff’s
preferred forum. Discrimination persists, but now it arises from differences
among state laws rather than from differences between state and federal law.
Forum-shopping of some kind is an inevitable result of our federal system:
As one scholar notes, “[S]o long as American common law [is] jurisdictionspecific, and so long as different state courts [adopt] contrasting doctrinal
rules, strategic filings by lawyers, and even the choice of residency by
individuals and corporations, [are] possible.”62
Nor did Erie eliminate the corporate advantages that Brandeis believed
flowed from access to federal common law. For one thing, state legislatures
and elected state judges are more vulnerable than their federal counterparts
to the pressures exerted by corporate campaign contributions and
expenditures.63 Whatever the situation at any particular point in history,
then, the potential for corporate advantage is greater under state law than
under federal law.
In addition, the advent of the class action as a powerful procedural
device to vindicate the rights of consumers, employees, shareholders, and
other victims of corporate misdeeds has altered the landscape in a way that
tilts the Erie doctrine in favor of corporate interests. Because of Erie,
bringing a nationwide consumer or products liability class action is in many
cases impossible even if the victims are spread across the country. In order
to bring suit as a class, the plaintiffs must show that common questions
predominate.64 To the extent that members of the plaintiff class are from

61. Under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), a
federal court must apply the choice-of-law doctrines of the state in which it sits. Thus a state court
and a federal court in the same state will apply the same law, although it may not be that of the
forum state. Notably, horizontal forum-shopping was a problem even before Erie, see PURCELL,
supra note 54, at 149–53, but the availability of a uniform federal law made it less significant than it
is today. Horizontal forum-shopping under Erie and Klaxon may be even more problematic in the
context of transnational litigation if state choice-of-law rules require the application of foreign law.
See Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691799.
62. White, supra note 58, at 796.
63. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265–67 (2009) (finding likelihood
of bias from campaign contribution in judicial elections). Corporate contributions to state legislative
races are likely to be more effective than contributions to federal races as a result of both greater
geographic compactness and the greater ability of state legislators to focus on single issues of
interest to corporations.
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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different states, different states’ laws will likely govern, and differences
among those laws will often prevent class certification.
As Judge Richard Posner stated when denying certification to a
nationwide class in a products liability case, “The voices of the quasisovereigns that are the states of the United States sing negligence with a
different pitch.”65 In reversing the district court’s decision to certify the
class and to finesse the differences among state laws by instructing the jury
on negligence in general, Judge Posner noted:
[The district judge] proposes to have a jury determine the
negligence of the defendants under a legal standard that does not
actually exist anywhere in the world. One is put in mind of the
concept of “general” common law that prevailed in the era of Swift
v. Tyson. The assumption is that the common law of the 50 states
and the District of Columbia, at least so far as bears on a claim of
negligence against drug companies, is basically uniform and can be
abstracted in a single instruction. . . . If one instruction on
negligence will serve to instruct the jury on the legal standard of
every state of the United States applicable to a novel claim,
implying that the claim despite its controversiality would be decided
identically in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, one
wonders what the Supreme Court thought it was doing in the Erie
case when it held that it was unconstitutional for federal courts in
diversity cases to apply general common law rather than the
common law of the state whose law would apply if the case were
being tried in state rather than federal court.66
Class litigation against national (or international) corporations would
thus be much easier under Swift than it is under Erie. Moreover, because of
differences among state choice-of-law doctrines, it is easier in some states
than in others to conclude that a single state’s law applies—which makes
class certification more likely—thus increasing the incentives for both
parties to forum-shop.67

65. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1301 (7th Cir. 1995).
66. Id. at 1300.
67. Compare, e.g., Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 626 (Okla. 2003) (certifying
nationwide breach-of-warranty class action against manufacturer because defendant’s home state
provides substantive law under “most significant relationship” choice-of-law doctrine), with, e.g.,
Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co. v. Bloodworth, No. M2003-02986-COA-R10-CV, 2007 WL 1966022 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2007) (decertifying class action by residents of twenty-six states against insurance company
because state of issuance or state in which accident occurred provides substantive law under “most
significant relationship” choice-of-law doctrine). See also Phillip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d
200, 230–33 (Md. 2000) (decertifying class action by Maryland residents against tobacco company
because Maryland residents’ claims might be governed by different states’ laws under lex loci
choice-of-law principle); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D.
Mo. 1997) (refusing to certify class action by Missouri resident against tobacco company in part
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The lack of uniformity is, if anything, worse under Erie than under
Swift. In the century between the two cases, the federal courts developed
cohesive and coherent doctrines in the areas that were determined to require
the application of general (rather than local) law. Although each state’s law
might differ, federal law was uniform. Erie eliminated even the possibility
of a uniform federal law, without eliminating the heterogeneity of state law.
We have thus gone from a regime in which at least one body of uniform law,
ultimately policed by a single Court, was often available to one in which
uniformity is at the mercy of fifty state courts. Nor does Erie always
guarantee intra-state uniformity, as federal courts have found ways to ignore
state decisions.68 And even the application of the Erie doctrine itself is not
uniform: federal courts disagree among themselves about important
questions such as whether they should follow state rules of statutory
interpretation.69
Finally, the Erie doctrine, no less than the Swift doctrine, requires
federal courts to draw impossible lines. Under Erie, federal courts apply
state substantive law but federal procedural law. As various Justices have
recognized since Erie itself, however, there is no clear line between
substance and procedure.70 The Justices have repeatedly disagreed with one
because “it is possible that different state’s laws will apply to the different claims asserted by a
single claimant”). See generally Sean Wlodarczyk, Variations in Certification: The Need for
Federal Intervention in Class-Action Choice of Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(canvassing how different states’ choice-of-law doctrines affect class certification). Differences
among state choice-of-law doctrines also reduce the predictability of legal outcomes. See Erin
O’Hara O’Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Exit and the American Illness (Ill. Program in Law, Behavior
& Soc. Sci., Working Paper No. LBSS11-08, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1745141.
For general discussion of the “regulatory mismatch” between nationwide injuries and limitations on
jurisdiction, see Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic, 62 VAND. L. REV.
1, 14–19 (2009).
68. Compare Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962)
(damages for breach of contract that provided for land reclamation limited to value of reclaimed land
even if reclamation operation would cost more), Thompson v. Andover Oil Co., 691 P.2d 77, 83
(Okla. Civ. App. 1984) (citing Peevyhouse), and Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847 (Okla.
1994) (citing Peevyhouse), with Rock Island Improvement Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 698 F.2d
1075, 1077–78 (10th Cir. 1983) (affirming damages for cost of reclamation, under Oklahoma law,
even though reclamation would cost more than fifty times the value of the reclaimed land;
concluding Oklahoma courts would no longer follow Peevyhouse), and Davis v. Shell Oil, 795 F.
Supp. 381, 385 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (citing Rock Island) (damages in Oklahoma not limited to value
of land).
69. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011).
70. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring) (“The
line between procedural and substantive law is hazy . . . .”); Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New
York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (“Matters of ‘substance’ and matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked
about in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law.
But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same key-words to very different problems.
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another and with various courts of appeals on where the line should be
drawn. Even in the 2009 Term—more than seventy years after Erie—a
divided Court once again reversed a court of appeals’ attempt to draw such a
line.71 There is no more a “satisfactory line of demarcation”72 between
substance and procedure under Erie than there was one between general and
local law under Swift. The Court has simply traded one set of uncertainties
for another.
In short, whatever the defects of Swift, Erie has not eliminated them and
may have exacerbated them. Practical considerations do not provide a
justification for the Court’s decision in Erie.
3. The “Unconstitutionality of the Course Pursued”
The unconstitutionality of the Swift doctrine is perhaps the most
controversial ground for Erie. The majority held that because “Congress has
no power to declare substantive rules of common law,” neither do federal
courts.73 Interpreting the Rules of Decision Act to allow federal courts to
fashion common law doctrines, Justice Brandeis wrote, “invade[s the] rights
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several states.”74
Lest there be any mistake that principles of federalism drove the decision,
Justice Brandeis also included a long quotation from Justice Field’s dissent
in an 1893 case.75 Justice Field conceded that he had followed Swift in the
past, but concluded that he had done so “erroneously.”76 Despite Swift’s
pedigree, he argued, “there stands, as a perpetual protest against its
repetition, the Constitution of the United States, which recognizes and
preserves the autonomy and independence of the States.”77
The conclusion that constitutional federalism principles commanded the
result in Erie was controversial from the beginning. Justice Reed refused to

Neither ‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants.”); id. at 115 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (“The words ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ or ‘remedial’ are not talismanic.”); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[I]n many
situations procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational separation becomes well-nigh
impossible.”); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (“Except at the extremes, the
terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ precisely describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they
mean in a particular context is largely determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy is
drawn.”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (calling the distinction between
substance and procedure a “logical morass”); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1450 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Rutledge in Cohen, 337 U.S. at 559).
71. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 130 S. Ct. at 1448.
72. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
73. Id. at 78.
74. Id. at 80.
75. Id. at 78–79.
76. Id. at 78 (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
77. Id.
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join that part of Justice Brandeis’s majority opinion, noting that he was “not
at all sure whether, in the absence of federal statutory direction, federal
courts would be compelled to follow state decisions. There was sufficient
doubt about the matter in 1789 to induce the first Congress to legislate.”78
Chief Justice Stone, who joined the majority in Erie without comment, wrote
a few years later that he thought that it was “not . . . at all clear that Congress
could not apply (enact) substantive rules of law to be applied by federal
courts.”79 Felix Frankfurter, not yet a Justice himself, criticized the Court’s
reliance on constitutional principles.80 The Court itself did not mention the
constitutional basis for Erie for almost two decades afterward.81 Similarly,
scholars have often struggled with federalism as a basis for Erie, questioning
it or watering it down; as one scholar notes, the federalism justification for
the decision “has been in nearly continuous decline.”82 One commentator
suggested that the Constitution is “functionally irrelevan[t] in cases covered
by the Rules of Decision and Rules Enabling Acts.”83
There is a reason for the controversy: Erie’s reliance on federalism is
utterly inconsistent with both contemporaneous and subsequent cases on
congressional power. It is doubtful that Erie’s federalism limitation on
congressional power was correct when it was decided, and doctrinal
developments have made it even less valid. As one commentator notes, the
1893 Field dissent on which Erie relied so heavily was written “near the
height of Lochner-era federalism” and “is steeped in now-discredited views
of state autonomy.”84 The Erie Railroad, like many of the litigants in Swiftera cases in which the courts applied federal common law, was engaged in

78. Id. at 91 (Reed, J., concurring).
79. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Owen Roberts (Jan. 3, 1941), in ALPHEUS THOMAS
MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 480 n.† (1956) [hereinafter MASON]; see also
Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Louis Brandeis (Mar. 23, 1938), in MASON, supra, at 478 (“You
say in effect that there is no constitutional power in Congress to require federal courts to apply rules
of law inconsistent with those in force in the state, unless Congress is acting under one of the
substantive powers granted to the national government . . . . [T]he matter is not, in my mind, entirely
free from doubt—the power may be implicit in the judicial sections.”).
80. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Stone (Apr. 27, 1938), in PURCELL, supra note
54, at 202–03; Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone (May 9, 1938), in PURCELL,
supra note 54, at 202–03; Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Stanley Reed (May 14, 1942), in
PURCELL, supra note 54, at 371 nn.38–39; see also FREYER, supra note 50, at 143, 181 n.79.
81. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 704 (1974).
82. Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 616 n.108 (2008).
83. Ely, supra note 81, at 706.
84. Green, supra note 82, at 615–16 n.108 (giving examples); see also Ernest A. Young, Sorting
Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 410–11 n.233 (2002)
(Erie rested on “assumptions of ‘dual federalism’ . . . that have mostly disappeared from our
jurisprudence.”).
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interstate commerce.85 Even in 1938, then, Congress would have had power
to regulate the railroad’s liability.86 And by definition, virtually all of the
Swift cases involved interstate transactions (else they would not be in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction); under modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence that was well-developed within a few years of Erie, Congress
would have power to regulate those transactions if they had any effect on
interstate commerce.87
It is therefore not surprising that academic commentators eventually
gave up on the notion that Erie was based on federalism-derived limits on
congressional authority. Instead they suggested that it was based on
principles of judicial federalism and separation of powers, that is, that the
Constitution “imposes a distinctive, independently significant limit on the
authority of the federal courts to displace state law.”88 As one scholar notes,
“the federalism principle identified by Erie . . . has been silently transformed
from a general constraint on the powers of the federal government into an
attenuated constraint that applies principally to one branch of that
government— the federal judiciary.”89 These scholars reason that because
states are represented in Congress but not in the federal courts, Congress

85. One scholar suggests that “as much as 80 percent” of all diversity cases between 1900 and
1938 “involved corporations engaged in interstate enterprise.” FREYER, supra note 50, at 101–02.
86. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (reversing earlier cases
and upholding congressional power to regulate labor relations under the Commerce Clause).
87. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Congress can limit amount of wheat
grown by farmer for his own consumption); Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Congress can
prohibit purely intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana). See also Green, supra note 82, at
606–14 (criticizing Erie’s federalism analysis); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1985) (“The federalism analysis of Erie is subject to
the powerful objection that the structure of government presupposed by Justice Brandeis’s opinion
no longer exists in any recognizable form. . . . [T]oday the federal government has authority to
regulate in virtually any area it chooses.”); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political
Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761,
766 n.19 (1989) (“[I]n light of the Supreme Court’s extremely broad construction of federal
constitutional power . . . it might be argued that today Erie’s constitutional component is no longer
good law.”).
88. Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words On Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682,
1682 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1975) (Erie “recognizes that
federal judicial power to displace state law is not coextensive with the scope of dormant
congressional power.”). One commentator calls this the “new myth” of Erie. Green, supra note 82.
See also Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the “New Erie” Canal, 1990 UTAH L. REV.
759 (identifying separation-of-powers limitations as the new Erie). Numerous contemporary
scholars subscribe to this new myth. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815 (1997); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321 (2001); Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal
Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513 (2002); Merrill, supra note 87; PURCELL, supra note 54, at
177; Redish, supra note 87.
89. Merrill, supra note 87, at 15.
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may override state law, but federal courts may not do so in the absence of
congressional authorization.
There are several significant problems with this new constitutional
justification for Erie. First, it finds no support in the decision itself. Justice
Brandeis’s majority opinion rested squarely on the lack of congressional
power over state tort claims, as his extended quotation from Justice Field’s
earlier dissent illustrates. Both Justice Butler’s dissent and Justice Reed’s
concurrence read the majority opinion as imposing a constitutional limit on
congressional authority (and both took issue with that limit).90
Contemporaneous commentary read it as a constitutional limitation on the
federal government as a whole.91 No commentator even thought to rest the
decision on any other constitutional ground until almost four decades later.92
Extending our view past the decision in Erie bolsters the conclusion that
the Court was not thinking in terms of constitutional limits on the judiciary.
On the same day that it decided Erie, it applied federal common law to
resolve a water dispute between two private parties, despite the absence of
any relevant federal statute or constitutional provision.93 It has continued to
create and apply federal common law,94 which suggests that the problem in
Erie was one of states’ rights generally, not judicial power specifically.
The proposition that federal courts have more limited power than the
federal legislature is also inconsistent with the views of the founding
generation and thus with any originalist interpretation of the Constitution.
That generation assumed that the powers of the various departments of the
federal government were co-extensive with regard to the states. While some
applauded that grant of power and some feared it would lead to
consolidation of all power in the federal government, none denied the power
of federal courts to declare the common law.95

90. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80–90 (1938) (Butler, J., dissenting); id. at 90–91
(Reed, J., concurring).
91. See, e.g., Benno Schmidt, Substantive Law Applied by the Federal Courts—Effect of Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 16 TEX. L. REV. 512 (1938); Recent Cases, 22 MINN. L. REV. 876, 887 (1938).
92. For further criticism of the notion of Erie as a separation-of-powers (or judicial federalism)
case, see Green, supra note 82, at 616–22. For a defense (which I find unpersuasive) of the notion
that Erie was always a separation-of-powers case, see PURCELL, supra note 54, at 203–06.
93. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). See also
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding that federal common law
displaces state law that would have barred recovery).
94. See generally Green, supra note 82, at 617 (“There is and always has been federal common
law.”); MARTIN H. REDISH, SUZANNA SHERRY & JAMES E. PFANDER, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES,
COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 897–990 (7th ed. 2012) (chapter collecting and examining cases on
“Federal Common Law”).
95. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 122–27 (1991).
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In addition, reading Erie as a separation-of-powers decision is
conceptually incoherent. If—as the new reading of Erie assumes—Congress
could enact governing law in diversity cases, then disallowing the courts
from making federal common law must embody a presumption that the
congressional failure to legislate is a deliberate decision to leave the area to
state law. But in other arenas in which Congress has the last word, we do
not assume that congressional silence always leaves state law in place or
disempowers the federal courts. For example, Congress’s failure to exercise
its authority under the Commerce Clause does not necessarily result in the
application of state law; the courts instead determine for themselves whether
the state’s interference with interstate commerce is too great and therefore
invalid.96 Although Congress could authorize such interference, we do not
infer from congressional silence a desire to let the states—rather than the
courts—make the decision in the absence of a federal statute.
Another problem with resting Erie on separation-of-powers grounds is
that congressional authority for federal courts creating and applying federal
common law—even if it displaces state law—is not lacking. As I suggested
earlier, the Rules of Decision Act should be read as inviting federal courts to
do just that, and had been interpreted that way with congressional
acquiescence for almost a century. Moreover, it is at least plausible to read
the grant of diversity jurisdiction as an authorization to develop federal
common law.97 Thus, to the extent that Congress is permitted to authorize
federal common lawmaking, nothing in the Erie opinion provides a
satisfactory justification for the decision.
Finally, the separation-of-powers rationale is, as the alternate term
“judicial federalism” suggests, inextricable from the discredited dual
sovereignty theory that underlay Justice Brandeis’s constitutional reasoning.
The scholars who reinterpret Erie as a separation-of-powers case defend its
limitations on federal court authority as a means of safeguarding federalism
and states’ rights, not as a way of protecting congressional prerogatives; no
one doubts that Congress could have overruled either Swift or any
application of it and explicitly directed the application of state law. Thus, to
the extent that Erie’s own broad federalism principles are widely
acknowledged as insufficient to support the decision (given other
precedents), transforming them into a theory that vests in Congress but not

96. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981);
Camps Newfound/Owatanna v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). See also Field, supra note 36, at 925
(“[C]ongressional failure to legislate in an area in its competence surely does not invariably or even
usually” signal a “congressional judgment that no federal lawmaking should exist.”).
97. See Field, supra note 36, at 915–19. For a contrary argument, see Tidmarsh & Murray,
supra note 44, at 621–23.
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the courts the power to displace state law does not escape that
insufficiency.98
Considered from a statutory, constitutional, or practical perspective,
then, Erie is wrong. In the next section, I argue that it was also out of step
with the Court’s contemporaneous jurisprudence and thus cannot be
explained as a product of its time.
B. Erie Is Not a Reflection of Its Time
We are so accustomed to the Erie doctrine that we fail to recognize just
how radical the decision was. Even in the absence of a century of precedent,
Erie is counterintuitive: As one scholar noted, anyone looking at the
Supremacy Clause would conclude that “picking between federal law and
state law would seem to be no choice at all—federal law is supposed to
win.”99 Given the well-established precedent, Erie is all the more surprising.
Robert Jackson, soon to become a Justice himself, called Erie “the most
remarkable decision of [the 1938–1940] period and in some respects one of
the most remarkable in the Court’s history.”100 And unlike some of the other
cases of the period that overruled existing precedent, Erie, as Jackson
pointed out, “was not impelled by ‘supervening economic events,’ nor was it
a part of the program of any political party.”101 Another contemporaneous
commentator described it as “a bolt from the blue.”102 A more recent
commentator labels the decision “breathtaking” in its scope.103 Another
modern scholar calls Erie “revolutionary,” noting that it “had nothing to do
with nationalism, redistribution, or any other part of the New Deal political

98. As one scholar notes, federalism and separation-of-powers concerns are “inextricably
intertwined” in this context. Redish, supra note 87, at 767. The only way to make the separation-ofpowers rationale do any work is to read Erie as a limit on federal court lawmaking in general, as a
way to constrain the courts rather than as a way to protect the states. This reading of Erie is
pernicious. See infra Part III.C.
99. Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law: Some
Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751, 751 (1998).
100. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 272 (1941).
101. Id. at 273. Jackson also notes that in overruling Swift, “the Court in effect has declared that
thousands of decisions of federal courts, which are no longer subject to correction, were wrongly
decided.” Id. at 283.
102. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 ILL. L. REV. NW. U.
493, 493 (1942).
103. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 746 (2009).
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agenda.”104 This was the Court striking out on its own—the litigants had not
even argued that Swift should be overruled.
Erie was not only unexpected, it was out of step with contemporaneous
cases. The 1936 and 1937 Supreme Court Terms are famous as the start of
the Court’s about-face on the breadth of federal power: after previously
striking down much of the New Deal on federalism grounds, the Court
reversed course, upheld major New Deal initiatives, and broadly expanded
the reach of federal power.105 A few years later it relegated the Tenth
Amendment’s federalism-based limit to the status of a “truism.”106 Not long
after that, the Court further undermined state sovereignty, and especially the
notion of exclusive territoriality,107 in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.108 That case overruled another venerable case from the dualsovereignty era, Pennoyer v. Neff,109 and reversed the longstanding principle
that each state had exclusive jurisdiction over those within its borders. And
the Court delivered the coup de grace in 1947, when it held in Testa v.
Katt110 that Congress could require a state court to entertain federal law
claims even if those claims ran afoul of state policies. The Erie Court’s
solicitude for state sovereignty, and its reliance on “pre-New Deal
federalism,”111 is inexplicable in the midst of this march toward federal
dominance.
Nor was Erie consistent with the judicial modesty that Brandeis himself
had unsuccessfully urged in 1936, before the sweeping changes of that
Term. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,112 the Court, over
Justice Brandeis’s objections, had decided a constitutional question in a suit
brought by stockholders against the corporation. Brandeis’s concurrence
argued that the Court could have, and should have, dismissed the suit for
lack of standing.113 He based his conclusion on a series of precedents that
together directed the Court to avoid constitutional questions whenever
possible, recognizing the “great gravity and delicacy” of the Court’s function

104. Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New
Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 461 (2001).
105. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also Bradford R. Clark,
Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1258 (1996)
(describing Erie’s federalism ground as “curious” in light of Jones & Laughlin).
106. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
107. For a discussion of how Swift was based on notions of territoriality, see GREVE, supra note
57, at 12–13, 19–20.
108. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
109. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
110. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
111. Green, supra note 82, at 607.
112. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
113. Id. at 341–55 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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of judicial review.114 In Erie, by contrast, “Brandeis’s Progressive politics
overrode all his prudential scruples, as he went out of his way to base the
decision on the broadest and most abstract possible Constitutional
grounds.”115
Finally, as noted earlier, on the same day that it issued the Erie decision
the Court nevertheless made clear that federal common law still governed in
some cases.116 Scholars have been trying ever since to delineate the scope of
federal common law in a way that renders it consistent with Erie; as one pair
of scholars notes, “federalism and separation of powers concerns leave no
room for federal common law to operate.”117
Whether we focus on the political or the jurisprudential landscape of
Erie’s era, then, the case is not only not explainable as a product of its time,
but it is also in great tension with its own era. Its survival for almost threequarters of a century also renders it more fit for contemporary criticism than
it would be had it been mooted or overruled within a few decades of its
inception. If Erie reflected only the sensibilities of its time, it would not be
thriving today. I turn in the next section, therefore, to a demonstration of
Erie’s failures in our own time.
C. Erie Is Pernicious
Erie is undoubtedly one of the most significant Supreme Court cases of
all time. It has been called “mythic,”118 “a star of the first magnitude in the
legal universe,”119 an “icon,”120 and a “modern orthodox[y].”121 The Erie

114. Id. at 345–48.
115. Robert W. Gordon, Book Review, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 549, 559 (2011). See also Susan
Bandes, Book Review, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 882
(2001) (“The Erie case is not usually associated with judicial restraint.”). The only way to view Erie
as consistent with the tenor of its time is to look solely at its possible effect on the outcome of cases:
Brandeis shared with at least some New Dealers an anti-business orientation, and Erie might have
been bad for corporate litigants. (It may no longer have that effect. See supra text accompanying
notes 64–67.). Jurisprudentially, however, Erie does not fit with other decisions of the era.
116. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
117. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 44, at 587 n.9.
118. Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 247 (2008). See
also Ely, supra note 81 (on Erie’s “irrepressible myth”); Green, supra note 82 (on “repressing Erie’s
myth”).
119. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 272 n.4 (1977).
120. Green, supra note 82, at 595.
121. Id.
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doctrine is “the most studied principle in American law.”122 It thus has the
potential to do great good or great harm. I contend that it has done more
harm than good, and that its most pernicious consequence is its effect on
jurisprudence and constitutional theory.123 Its warped view of constitutional
structure and the role of the judiciary has infected almost every corner of our
public-law jurisprudence, from constitutional interpretation to international
law.
If Erie had been confinable to the federalism principles on which it
originally rested, it might have done little harm. As I suggested previously,
Brandeis’s view of federalism was outdated in 1938 and has since been
completely abandoned. The problem is that once federalism disappeared as
a possible justification for Erie, scholarly commentators found a different
theoretical justification—one with long and potentially devastating tentacles.
The new justification—Erie’s “new myth”—is that federal courts have more
limited authority than the federal legislature to displace state law. But as I
elaborate in this section, that new myth has lent support to a distorted view
of what judges do and what they are supposed to do, in ways that are
detrimental to our constitutional democracy.
Viewing Erie as a case about the federal judiciary has created a
revisionist view of its meaning. As one modern revisionist scholar describes
it, Erie was part of a judicial “New Deal Revolution” that was less about
“embracing Rooseveltian Progressivism” than about “reestablishing the
legitimacy of judicial review in the modern world.”124 The Court
reestablished legitimacy, according to this scholar, by constructing “a new
and more legitimate approach to judicial review,” the “core principle” of
which “was the embrace of textual originalism.”125 Another commentator
echoes this revisionist view, suggesting that Erie is one of “a series of
significant decisions that constrain judicial lawmaking,” because “law[s]
‘made’ by the federal judiciary lack[] . . . constitutional legitimacy.”126 Yet
another scholar similarly suggests that by denying the legitimacy of all
judicial “lawmaking” in the absence of a congressional delegation, Erie
undermined non-originalist judicial review, especially in cases decided
under the rubric of substantive due process.127

122. Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78
MICH. L. REV. 311, 312 (1980).
123. I leave to one side the practical and political difficulties identified in Part III.A.2. (and the
torture that the Erie doctrine has inflicted on generations of law students), although some might
consider them significant.
124. Lash, supra note 104, at 462.
125. Id. at 464.
126. Clark, supra note 88, at 1403.
127. Merrill, supra note 87. See especially id. at 3 (“[T]he legitimacy of non-originalist judicial
review—can profitably be analyzed as [an] issue[] of federal common law.”); id. at 6 (federal
common law includes “all federal rules of decision not mandated on the face of a federal text”); id.
at 17 (the thesis of Erie as a judicial federalism case “suggests that federal courts may ‘interpret’
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Beyond constitutional law, a number of scholars have argued that Erie
should be read as severely limiting the authority of the federal courts to
make federal common law, even in the absence of competing state law,
despite the fact that enclaves of federal common law have existed since the
day Erie was decided.128 Others have used the new version of Erie to cast
doubt on the validity of customary international law.129 One scholar
contends that Erie’s ban on federal judicial lawmaking means that federal
courts should not make what are often called “Erie guesses”—predicting
how a state court would resolve a dispute when the state law is unclear.130
In all of these contexts, Erie is used to suggest that the Court itself has
long believed that judicial “lawmaking” is of questionable legitimacy and
thus must be constrained and confined. Erie has been drafted into service in
the war against judicial “activism.” (Ironically, of course, Brandeis’s
opinion in Erie was itself an instance of judicial lawmaking and judicial
activism, overturning a longstanding interpretation of an unchanged federal
statute on the basis of a flimsy constitutional argument.) As one scholar
notes, the revisionist view of Erie “cloak[s] a wide range of antijudicial
ideas in Erie’s conventional garb.”131 And recourse to Erie and its 1789
Judicial Act roots gives these judicial critiques a false pedigree; in fact, the
first published occurrence of the term “judicial activism” was in 1947.132
Erie thus encourages a view of judicial actions as divided into two
wholly separate categories: legitimate judicial interpretation and illegitimate
constitutional provisions and congressional legislation, so long as interpretation is understood to
mean a search for the specific intentions of the enacting body”); id. at 20 (“[T]he separation-ofpowers principle has probably eclipsed federalism as the dominant ground for questioning
lawmaking by federal courts.”); id. at 27–32 (analyzing Swift and the Rules of Decision Act); id. at
59–69, 68 n.293 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and condemning non-originalist judicial
review).
128. See, e.g., MARTIN REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 29–46 (1991);
CLARK, supra note 105, at 1258. This particular use of Erie has a long pedigree. See, e.g., PHILIP B.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 61–63 (1970); George D.
Brown, Of Activism and Erie—The Implication Doctrine’s Implications for the Nature and Role of
the Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617 (1984).
129. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 88; Meltzer, supra note 88. Three Justices
appear to agree with this position. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 740–46 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
130. Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495–517 (1997).
131. Green, supra note 82, at 598. The continued existence of federal common law, including
constitutional common law, suggests that these attacks have been less than successful in reducing
judicial activism. In some ways, that makes the effects of this use of Erie even more troubling; it
has, as I argue below, harmed our jurisprudential discourse, and it has done so without achieving the
reforms that its proponents advocate.
132. See Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CALIF.
L. REV. 1441, 1446 (2004).
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judicial lawmaking. That stark dichotomy is false as a descriptive matter—
interpreting law and creating law slide into one another on a continuum.133
Common law and constitutional interpretation are not nearly as far apart as
these revisionists would have us believe.134 This view of judicial decisionmaking narrows our vision of constitutional interpretation, leading jurists
across the political spectrum to claim that constitutional adjudication is
constrained and uncreative, equivalent to an umpire’s call of balls and
strikes.135
Describing the world as dichotomous also stunts our jurisprudential
discourse. The dichotomy allows critics of any particular decision (or group
of decisions) to elide the hard questions about whether the decision is
defensible, enabling them instead to reject it as illegitimate per se without
serious analysis. And once we begin to believe that the Court is acting
illegitimately—rather than simply erroneously—when it reaches a decision
with which we disagree, it becomes impossible to carry on a thoughtful
dialogue with those on the other side. As more people come to see judicial
review as illegitimate, faith in the rule of law diminishes, and adjudication—
especially constitutional adjudication—comes to be seen as just politics by
another name. Conventional wisdom reflects an extreme version of what
Professor White, elsewhere in this symposium, called the modern view of
the role of judges: that they are unable to protect individual rights without
simply enacting their own preferences into law.136
When we thus erase the distinction between law and politics, judicial
review—now seen as judges imposing their own political or policy
preferences—develops a bad reputation. Everyone, judges included, urges
judicial restraint and condemns judicial activism. And everyone wants
judicial policy-makers who subscribe to their own brand of politics.
This chain of consequences should sound ominously familiar. We are
now enjoying the benefits of Erie’s dichotomy in the form of a highly
politicized judicial nomination process, and academic calls either to abandon
judicial review and substitute popular constitutionalism or to constrain

133. For other scholars endorsing such a continuum, see, for example, Field, supra note 36, at
893–94; Westen & Lehman, supra note 122, at 331–36.
134. See DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (describing constitutional
interpretation as a common law approach). See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009) (describing how
judges make decisions, including constitutional decisions).
135. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they
apply them.”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 59 (2009) (statement of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, nominee) (“The task of a
judge is not to make law, it is to apply the law.”); id. at 79 (job of judges is “like umpires”).
136. G. Edward White, Determining Notoriety in Supreme Court Decisions, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
197, 220–21 (2011).
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judicial discretion by means of some utopian grand theory of
interpretation.137 The judiciary, it seems, is in danger of losing both its
independence and its ability to lead.138
IV. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE WORST CASES OF ALL TIME
Some readers might agree with everything I have said except the
conclusion that Erie’s effects are detrimental. If Erie is encouraging judicial
restraint and discouraging judicial activism, you might say, all the better. In
all but cases in which the Constitution’s clear language dictates a different
result, democratic majorities should prevail over the views of unelected
federal judges.
But consider the lesson of the rest of the essays in this symposium
before condemning judicial activism. Leave aside Dred Scott, which is
probably sui generis because it involved issues that ultimately led to the
Civil War and because the Court (wrongly but self-consciously) thought it
was preventing a national constitutional crisis. Except for Dred Scott, every
one of the cases chosen by the other symposium participants involves a
judicial failure to strike down a democratically enacted state or federal
law.139 The Court in each case deferred to popular will—and in each case
doing so was, as the title of this symposium suggests, a “Supreme Mistake.”
In other words, the errors are worse when the Court lets bad laws stand
than when it strikes good laws down. We need more judicial activism, not
less. By casting a policy decision as a constitutional mandate, and placing a
murky constitutional imprimatur on judicial restraint, Erie threatens to
deprive us of one of our oldest and most effective tools for avoiding majority
tyranny. If Erie’s modern defenders have their way, Erie’s legacy is likely

137. On the futility of grand theories, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
(2002).
138. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1416 (2000); Justin Driver, Why Law Should Lead, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 2010, at 28.
139. To the list in the symposium I might add Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), and
its progeny, which upheld censorship and the punishment of those who advocated unpopular
political ideas; after a run of five decades, these cases were thoroughly repudiated in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). I think history will eventually add Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (upholding a state ban on consensual homosexual sodomy), which has already been
overturned in a case that said it “was not correct when it was decided, and . . . is not correct today.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). And just to anticipate one possible objection: We
should automatically exclude from the list of “worst cases” any case over which there is a serious
division of opinion, which means that cases like Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (both invalidations of state laws, reviled by two almost completely
non-overlapping political camps) cannot serve as counter-examples.
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to be more cases like Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu. It is hard to imagine a
more troubling future.
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